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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintifl7AppeIlee, : 
Priority No. 2 
v. : 
DEANO R. ALIRES, : Case No. 960259-CA 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant appeals his conviction for attempted possession of a controlled 
substance (methamphetamine), a class A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 
58-37-8(2)(aXi) (1991). The Court has jurisdiction of the appeal under Utah Code Ann. § 
78-2a-3(2)(f) (1996). 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Was defendant's arrest for driving on a suspended license supported 
by probable cause? 
Because defendant failed to specifically and particularly raise this claim 
below, and does not argue any exception to the preservation requirement on appeal, this 
claim is not subject to review under any standard. State v. Johnson, 17A P.2d 1141,1144-
1 
45 (Utah 1989) (requiring "some form of specific preservation of claims of error [below] 
before an appellate court will review such :laim on appeal"); State v. Pledger, 896 P.2d 
1226,1229 n.5 (Utah 1995) (where appellant does not argue that "exceptional 
circumstances" or "plain error" justifies review of an unpreserved issue, the reviewing 
court will decline to consider it on appeal). 
2. Did the trial court correctly conclude that the warrantless search of 
the passenger compartment of defendant's car was justified as incident to his arrest 
for driving on a suspended license? 
A trial court's findings in support of its determination to deny a motion to 
suppress evidence are reviewed under the "deferential clearly-erroneous standard." State 
v. Moreno, 910 P.2d 1245,1247 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 916 P.2d 909 (Utah 1996). A 
trial courts supporting legal conclusions are "reviewed for correctness, with a measure of 
discretion given to the trial judge's application of the legal standard to the facts." Id. 
(citing State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932,935-40 (Utah 1994)). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES AND RULES 
The right of the people to be secure in their person, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall ftot be violated, 
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized. 
U.S. Const, amend. IV 
2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with possession of a controlled substance 
(methamphetamine), with intent to distribute, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 58-37-8(l)(a)(ivX1991), possession of drug paraphernalia, a class B 
misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a-5 (1991), driving on suspension, a 
class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 53-3-227 (1991), and driving an 
unregistered vehicle, a class C misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-la-
1303 (1991) (R. 7-10). 
Defendant moved to suppress the evidence seized pursuant to a warrantless 
vehicle search (R. 44-46).1 Following an evidentiary hearing, the motion was denied (R. 
343-50).2 Thereafter, defendant entered a conditional guilty plea to attempted unlawful 
possession of methamphetamine, a class A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (1991), reserving the right to appeal the denial of his motion to 
suppress (R. 178-185). 
The trial court sentenced defendant to twelve months in the Salt Lake 
County Jail, which term was stayed pending satisfactory completion of two years 
probation (R. 189-90). 
1
 The motion to suppress is reproduced in addendum A. 
2
 The transcript of the evidentiary hearing is reproduced in addendum B. The 
trial court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law are reproduced in addendum C. 
3 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS3 
Traffic Stop For No Front Plate. At half-past midnight, on 13 October 
1994, Utah Highway Patrol Trooper Michael Rapich stopped a gray Honda prelude 
traveling northbound on State Street for failing to display a front license plate (R. 210-11, 
217).4 
Driving on a Suspended License. Once the Honda stopped, Trooper 
Rapich approached and requested that defendant, who was the driver and sole occupant, 
to produce his driver's license and vehicle registration (R. 213). Defendant was unable to 
produce the vehicle registration, but did produce his driver's license {Id.). As defendant 
handed his license to Trooper Rapich, defendant stated that his license was suspended 
{Id.). Upon learning of defendant's suspended license, Trooper Rapich determined to 
arrest defendant, although this was not directly communicated to defendant (R. 228). 
Suspicion of Unregistered and/or Stolen Vehicle. Trooper Rapich asked 
defendant to step out and stand at the back of the Honda, out of traffic, (R. 213), where he 
could safely question defendant about the Honda's owner (R. 221). In addition to the 
suspended license, Trooper Rapich suspected that the Honda may be unregistered or 
3
 The State recites the facts in a light supporting the trial court's ruling. See, 
e.g., State v. Troyer, 910 P.2d 1182,1186 (Utah 1995). 
4
 See Utah Code Ann. § 41- la-401(l)(b) (1993) ("The license plate shall be 
issued for the particular vehicle registered and may not be removed during the term for 
which the license plate is issued or used upon any other vehicle than the registered 
vehicle."). 
4 
stolen (R. 211-12,230). Defendant said that the Honda belonged to a friend (R. 222-23). 
Trooper Rapich then asked if defendant had anything illegal in the Honda, and also asked 
for defendant's permission to search the Honda (R. 223,225). Initially defendant 
acquiesced and gave his permission for the search, but later told Trooper Rapich that he 
thought the Honda's owner needed to give the trooper permission to search (R. 225-26). 
Methamphetamine and Drug Paraphernalia Found Trooper Rapich was 
ultimately unable to determine who owned the Honda and made no attempt to contact the 
owner, nor did defendant ask to contact the owner (R. 226,230). Opening the passenger 
door of the Honda, Trooper Rapich located a black fanny pack on the rear seat (R. 215). 
Inside the fanny pack the trooper found two plastic baggies containing methamphetamine 
(Id). In addition to the fanny pack, Trooper Rapich located and searched a cloth gym bag 
which contained a set of scales with methamphetamine residue on it and approximately 
one hundred baggies, identical to the baggies containing methamphetamine (R. 215). 
Arrest for Drug Offenses, Driving on a Suspended License, and Driving 
an Unregistered Vehicle. Defendant was formally arrested at this juncture, for 
methamphetamine possession (R. 228,231). Additionally, Trooper Rapich called in the 
license plate and discovered that the plate was registered to another vehicle (R. 215). A 
check of the vehicle identification number (VIN) returned no indication that the vehicle 
was stolen (Id). A warrants check on defendant, however, revealed that defendant had an 
outstanding warrant for DUI and that his license was suspended for DUI (R. 214). Thus, 
5 
in addition to the drug offenses, Trooper Rapich charged defendant with driving on a 
suspended license and driving an unregistered vehicle (R. 11-14,222). 
Motion to Suppress Denied. Prior to trial, defendant moved to suppress the 
evidence seized during the warrantless search (R. 44-45), see addendum A. Following 
an evidentiary hearing, where only Trooper Maycock testified, the trial court denied the 
motion (R. 343-49), see addendum C. While the trial court disagreed that defendant had 
voluntarily consented to the vehicle search, the trial court upheld the seizure of 
contraband as incident to defendant's arrest (Id). The trial court found, in pertinent part: 
3. That Utah Highway Patrol Trooper, Michael Rapich, 
testified that he observed a gray Honda Prelude automobile 
traveling northbound on State Street, 
4. That he stated the Honda did not display a front license 
plate. 
5. That Trooper Rapich stopped the Honda because of the 
lack of a front plate. 
6. That the defendant was the sole occupant of the Honda. 
7. That Trooper Rapich requested that the defendant produce 
his driver's license and the Honda's registration. 
8. That defendant produced a driver's license which he stated was 
suspended because of a D1JI violation. 
9. That defendant was unable to produce a vehicle registration. 
10. That defendant stated he had borrowed the Honda from 
one friend to help another friend move. 
11. That the Trooper stated he observed that the defendant 
6 
acted in a nervous manner when questioned about the 
Honda's ownership. 
12. That at this point Trooper Rapich decided to arrest the 
defendant because the latter's license was suspended. 
13. That Trooper Rapich did not formally place the defendant 
under arrest, either by stating those words or by placing 
handcuffs on the defendant. 
14. That Trooper Rapich testified the defendant was not free 
to go at this point and that he believed defendant knew this, 
and that despite the fact that the word "arrest" was not 
spoken; defendant was in custody and, as a practical matter, 
"arrested." 
15. That Trooper Rapich testified that he then asked the 
defendant if there were weapons or anything illegal within the 
Honda. 
16. That the Trooper stated the defendant told him there were 
neither weapons nor illegal items in the vehicle. 
17. That Trooper Rapich testified he asked defendant if the 
latter "minded' if the former "looked in the vehicle." 
18. That Rapich testified that the defendant initially stated he 
believed Trooper Rapich needed the owner's consent but 
eventually gave "consent" to look in the vehicle. 
19. That as the Trooper testified his appearance and 
demeanor was that of a gentle, soft-spoken person. That the 
Trooper was not large or intimidating in appearance or in his 
presence. 
20. The Court finds the Trooper was credible in suggesting 
that a non-coercive, threatening situation existed. 
21. That Trooper Rapich testified that he discovered a black 
fanny pack and a cloth gym bag on the back seat of the 
7 
Honda. 
22. That the Trooper testified that two small baggies 
containing a white powdering substance were located in the 
fanny pack. 
23. That he testified he also located several photographs in 
the fanny pack, and that one depicted the defendant. 
24. That the Trooper testified that the cloth gym bag 
contained approximately 100 small, empty baggies and a set 
of scales which bore a white powdery residue. 
25. That when questioned, defendant admitted to the 
ownership of the fanny pack and the controlled substance 
found within, which he identified as methamphetamine. 
26. That at the time of the questioning, Trooper Rapich had 
not yet informed defendant of his constitutional rights per 
Miranda v. Arizona. 
27. That Trooper Rapich subsequently determined that the 
rear license plate was not registered to the Honda in 
defendant's possession. 
28. That Trooper Rapich could not determine ownership of 
the Honda through the VIN. 
29. That based upon the above, the Trooper testified that the 
defendant was then formally arrested and transported to the 
Salt Lake County Jail. 
30. That the Trooper testified that the defendant was detained 
for approximately five minutes before he was formally 
arrested. 
31. The Court finds that the Trooper was credible in his 
testimony and Court adopts the referenced testimony as the 
facts. 
8 
(R. 344-48), see addendum C. 
Based on these factual findings, the trial court concluded that: 
1. The initial stop of defendant's vehicle was supportable, 
due to the observed [license plate] problem. 
2. The defendant was not subjected to an unreasonable 
detention. 
3. The defendant did not give clear, unequivocal consent to 
the Trooper, allowing a "consent search" of the vehicle, 
despite the Trooper's perception. 
4. The search of the vehicle cannot, under these facts, be 
supported on the "impound exception" to the search warrant 
requirement. 
5. The statements concerning ownership of the controlled 
substance are not admissible, because they were made 
pursuant to an in-custody interrogation, while defendant was, 
practically speaking, under arrest, and defendant had not been 
informed of his "Miranda" rights to remain silent, etc. 
6. The search of the vehicle was substantially 
contemporaneous with defendant's arrest and probable cause 
existed for the arrest independent of the evidence found in the 
search. 
7. The evidence obtained as a result of the search of the 
Honda should not be suppressed, because it was obtained 
incident to, and substantially contemporaneous with the arrest 
of Mr. Alires. 
(R. 348-49), see addendum C. 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
Defendant does not the dispute the validity of the traffic stop based on the 
license plate violation, but rather, challenges the scope of the ensuing detention. 
Although defendant has couched his claim as a scope of detention issue, when distilled to 
its essence, defendant's claim really constitutes a challenge to the basis for his arrest for 
driving on a suspended license. This precise claim was not preserved in the trial court 
and is therefore waived. 
POINT II 
Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial 
court's factual finding that the trooper subjectively intended to arrest him upon his 
admission that he had been driving on a suspended license. However, the pertinent 
Fourth Amendment inquiry is not whether the trooper subjectively intended to arrest 
defendant for driving on a suspended license, but whether, objectively, the trooper was 
authorized to make the arrest Therefore, even if defendant were to successfully assail the 
trial court's factual determination, his sufficiency challenge misses the mark and should 
be rejected. Moreover, in State v. Harmon, the Utah Supreme Court definitively held that 
an arrest for driving on a suspended license is statutorily authorized and constitutionally 
reasonable. Defendant makes no contrary argument. 
Defendant's further broad claim, that the search was not justified by the 
10 
safety and evidence preservation concerns undergirding the search incident to arrest 
doctrine, was not argued below and is consequently waived. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
DEFENDANT'S PURPORTED CHALLENGE TO THE 
SCOPE OF HIS DETENTION IS IN ESSENCE A 
CHALLENGE TO THE BASIS FOR HIS ARREST FOR 
DRIVING ON A SUSPENDED LICENSE; THIS CLAIM 
WAS NOT PRESERVED BELOW AND IS 
THEREFORE WAIVED 
In Point I of his brief, defendant to challenges the scope of his detention 
following his admission that his driver's license was suspended. Specifically, defendant 
complains that his admission constituted only reasonable suspicion for Trooper Rapich to 
further investigate the status of his driving privilege. Br. of Aplt. at 9-10. On that 
ground, defendant disputes the legitimacy of his further detention while the trooper asked 
him if there were any weapons or illegal items inside his vehicle, and also asked for 
consent to search.5 Br. of Aplt. at 9. Defendant maintains that the trooper should have 
instead immediately run a computer check to verify that his driver's license was 
suspended. Id. The trooper's failure to do so, defendant maintains, rendered the scope of 
the ensuing detention constitutionally unreasonable. Id. 
5
 Although the State refers to the Honda defendant was driving as "his 
vehicle," Trooper Rapich was never able to determine who actually owned the Honda (R. 
230). 
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Although defendant couches his claim as a scope of detention issue, when 
distilled to its essence defendant's claim really constitutes a challenge to the basis for his 
arrest for driving on a suspended license. Indeed, there is no scope of detention issue in 
this case. Trooper Rapich was authorized to request defendant's driver's license. See, 
e.g., State v. Johnson, 805 P.2d 761,763 (Utah 1991) (following a justifiable traffic stop, 
an officer may request to see the driver's license and registration, conduct a computer 
check and issue a citation). In response, defendant stated that his license was suspended 
(R. 345), see addendum C. In light of defendant's admission and his subsequent arrest for 
driving on a suspended license, the pertinent inquiry becomes, not whether the trooper 
had reasonable suspicion for further investigation, but whether defendant's admission and 
the reasonable inferences therefrom constituted probable cause for his arrest. See, e.g., 
State v. Leonard, 825 P.2d 664,669 (Utah App. 1991) (holding warrantless arrest proper 
if "from the facts known to the officer, and the inferences which fairly might be drawn 
therefrom, a reasonable and prudent person in his position would be justified in believing 
that the suspect had committed the offense" (quoting State v. Hatcher, 27 Utah 2d 318, 
320,495 P.2d 1259,1260 (1972))), cert, denied, 843 P.2d 1042 (Utah 1992). Incident to 
a lawful arrest, police are entitled to search the area within the arrestee's immediate 
control, including the arrestee's vehicle,, New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454,460-61 
(1981) (holding that following a lawful arrest, police may search the passenger 
compartment of the arrestee's automobile, and also examine the contents of any 
12 
containers found therein); State v. Moreno, 910 P.2d 1245,1248 (Utah App. 1996) 
(same). The trial court upheld the instant search on this basis (R. 349), see addendum C. 
Significantly, defendant raised no challenge to the basis for his arrest in the 
trial court (R. 44-45 (motion to suppress), R. 237-244 (oral argument)), see addendums A 
and B. Because this issue is now raised for the first time on appeal, it is waived. See 
State v. Johnson, 11\ P.2d 1141,1144 (Utah 1989) (requiring "some form of specific 
preservation of claims of error" in the trial court "before an appellate court will review 
such claim on appeal"). Defendant fails to argue any exception to the preservation 
requirement on appeal, therefore, his challenge to the basis for his arrest is not subject to 
review under any standard. See State v. Pledger, 896 P.2d 1226,1229 n.5 (Utah 1995) 
(stating that where appellant does not argue that "exceptional circumstances" or "plain 
error" justifies review of an unpreserved issue, the reviewing Court will decline to 
consider it on appeal). 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY UPHELD THE 
WARRANTLESS SEIZURE OF METHAMPHETAMINE 
AND DRUG PARAPHERNALIA FROM DEFENDANT'S 
VEHICLE AS INCIDENT TO DEFENDANT'S ARREST 
FOR DRIVING ON A SUSPENDED LICENSE 
A. Objective Inquiry 
In Point 11(A) of his brief, defendant challenges the trial court's finding that 
Trooper Rapich subjectively intended to arrest him upon learning that his license was 
13 
suspended (R. 345), see addendum C. Defendant's focus on the subjective intent of 
Trooper Ripich, see Br. of Aplt. at 14-18, misses the mark. The pertinent Fourth 
Amendment inquiry is not whether the trooper subjectively intended to arrest defendant, 
but whether objectively, he could have arrested defendant. State v. Harmon, 910 P.2d 
1196,1206 (Utah 1995) (rejecting "pretext arrest" analysis and holding that "[t]he validity 
of an arrest must be analyzed on objective criteria, not an officer's subjective motivations 
or suspicions"). See also Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, (1978) (rejecting subjective 
inquiry for Fourth Amendment purposes: u[T]he fact that the officer does not have the 
state of mind which is hypothecated by the reasons which provide the legal justification 
for the officer's action does not invalidate the action taken as long as the circumstances, 
viewed objectively, justify that action."). Consequently, even assuming defendant 
successfully assailed the trial court's factual finding, it is simply irrelevant whether 
Trooper Rapich subjectively intended to arrest defendant at precisely the same moment he 
was objectively entitled to do so.6 Id. In Harmon, the Supreme Court further found that 
6
 It is defendant's burden, as the appellant, to "marshal all the evidence 
supporting the trial court's findings, and then show that evidence to be insufficient." 
State v. Drobel, 815 P.2d 724,734 (Utah App.), cert denied, 836 P.2d 1383 (Utah 1991). 
Here, Trooper Rapich indicated that it was intent to arrest defendant upon learning of his 
suspended license (R. 228). The trooper's other additional statements, that defendant was 
not free to drive away (R. 214), that he was going to investigate further and found out 
why defendant's license was suspended (id.), and that once he found out defendant had an 
outstanding warrant, he was going to take defendant to jail (id.), are not inconsistent with 
the trial court's finding and thus they fail to demonstrate any clear error therein (R. 345), 
see addendum C. 
14 
an arrest for driving on a suspended license was both statutorily authorized and 
constitutionally reasonable. 910P.2d 1199-12(4. Defendant makes no contrary argument 
here. 
B» Waiver 
As for defendant's claim in Point II (B), that the instant search was not 
justified by the safety and evidence preservation rationales underlying the search incident 
to arrest doctrine, Br. of Aplt. at 19-21, a search incident to arrest may be conducted 
regardless of whether there is probable cause to believe that the arrestee has a weapon or is 
about to destroy evidence. United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1,15 (1977). 
More importantly here, however, this issue was not preserved below and is 
therefore waived. Indeed, defendant raised no challenge to the basis for his arrest below 
(see Point I, supra), nor did challenge the basis for the search incident to his arrest (R. 44-
45 (motion to suppress), R. 237-244 (oral argument)), see addendums A and B. Because 
defendant failed to specifically and particularly raise his challenge to the basis for the 
search incident to his arrest below, and does not argue any exception to the preservation 
requirement on appeal, this claim is not subject to review under any standard. State v. 




Based on the foregoing arguments, this Court should affirm the trial court's 
denial of defendant's motion to suppress and should affirm defendant's conviction. 
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MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
EVIDENCE DISCOVERED AS A 
RESULT OF ILLEGAL DETENTION 
AND WARRANTLESS SEARCH 
Case No. 951901698FS 
THE HONORABLE LESLIE A. LEWIS 
—ooooOoooo— 
Comes now the defendant, Deano Alires, by and through his attorney of record, 
Richard P. Mauro, and moves this Court to suppress all evidence discovered as a result of the 
Utah Highway Patrol's illegal stop and detention of the vehicle Mr. Alires's was driving. The 
police lacked reasonable suspicion to stop and detain that vehicle. £& Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-
15; Sandv Citv v. Thorsness. 778 P.2d 1011, 1012 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). As such any 
evidence discovered as a result of that detention should be suppressed. State v. Shoulderblade. 
slip op., at 4, case no. 930518 (Utah 10/25/95). 
Here any consent to search was not sufficiently attenuated from the illegal stop; 
therefore, any evidence seized as a result of the stop must be suppressed. Shoulderblade. slip 
op. at 4; State v. Arroyo. 796 P.2d 684,688 (Utah 1990); Sims v. Collection Div. of Utah State 
Tax Comm'n. 841 P.2d 6, 9 (Utah 1992). 
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Furthermore, any consent given was not voluntary. State v, Whittenback. 621 P.2d 
103,106 (Utah 1980); State v. Bobo. 803 P.2d 1268 (Utah App. 1990); State v. Contrel. 886 
P.2d 107 (Utah App. 1994). 
The state bears the burden of showing that the police possessed reasonable 
articulable suspicion to support an investigative stop. State v. Case. 884 P.2d at 1275; State v. 
Delanev. 869 P.2d 4, 7 (Utah App. 1994). The state also bears the burden of showing that the 
warrantless entry was justified by the existence of probable cause and exigent circumstances. 
Laracco. 794 P.2d 460. Here the police lacked both probable cause, s ^ State v. South. 885 
P.2d 795 (Utah App. 1994) (probable cause defined as a "fair probability that contraband or 
evidence of a crime will be found"), and exigent circumstances. State v. Beavers. 859 P.2d 9 
(Utah App. 1993)("circumstances that would cause a reasonable person to believe that entry . 
. . was necessary to prevent physical harm to the officers or other persons, the destruction of 
relevant evidence, the escape of the suspect, or some other consequence improperly frustrating 
legitimate law enforcement efforts." (quoting United States v. McConnev. 728 F.2d 1195,1199, 
(9th Cir.) £SL denied 469 U.S. 824 (1984)). 
DATED this U? day of November, 1994. 
-$,)*** Pm^~ 
Richard P. Mauro 
Attorney for defendant 
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MAILED/DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing Motion to Suppress Evidence 
Discovered as a Result of Illegal Warrantless Search to the Salt Lake County Attorney's Office, 
231 East Fourth South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 this A . day of November, 1994. 
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SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH; NOVEMBER 27, 1995; A.M. SESSION 
THE COURT: We're here in the matter of State 
versus Alires. We're here in connection with the 
defense's motion to suppress statements and evidence 
seized. I've had an opportunity to read the motion and 
memoranda that Mr. Mauro has filed, I haven't received 
anything from the state, and I'm happy to hear argument. 
MR. UPDE6R0VE: I'm sorry, Your Honor, the 
state's motion, Linda Bethy had taken it over on the 
15th of November, but I don't know what happened to it. 
It was- -
THE COURT: You mean there is something 
that's been filed? 
MR. UPDEGROVE: Yes, ma'am. 
THE COURT: Why don't you hand it to my clerk 
and I'll get a copy of it. It has not been filed. 
MR. MAURO: I don't believe I have that, 
either. 
THE COURT: Is this your only copy? 
MR. UPDEGROVE: I can get one off the 
computer, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: How can you argue it if you don't 
have it? Mr. Mauro, could you ask my law clerk to step 
in so I can maybe get a couple of copies of this? All 
right, well I will obviously have not the benefit of 
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looking at it ahead of time, but Z will look at it in a 
moment. 
Mr. Mauro, do you want to proceed? 
MR. MAURO: Yes, Your Honor. Judge, there 
was another motion also, the motion to suppress the 
custodial statement. Do you have that? 
THE COURT: Z have that. That's the motion Z 
referred to, and then there is the memorandum attached 
to that, that Z guess actually there's a second motion. 
Z've read it all, Z was thinking it was part of the 
same. But there are two motions, you're correct. Any 
time you're ready. 
MR. MAURO: Z think the burden would be on 
the state to show that the search was legal in this 
case. We filed the motion because we're challenging the 
legality of the search and the legality of the 
statements. 
THE COURT: What I was wondering is if each 
of you wanted to make some kind of introductory 
statement before calling witnesses. 
MR. MAURO: Ho, Your Honor. 
MR. UPDE6R0VE: No, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Mr. Updegrove, you have a 
witness? 
MR. UPDEGROVE: Yes. 
COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPT 
MR. MAURO: And we'd move to invoice the 
exclusionary rule. 
MR. UPDEGROVE: The State would call Trooper 
Rapich. 
MICHAEL S. RAPICH 
called as a witness by and on behalf of the State, 
having been duly sworn, was examined and testified as 
follows: 
THE COURT: You may proceed. 
MR. UPDEGROVE: Thank you, Your Honor. 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. UPDEGROVE: 
Q Please state your name and spell your last 
name. 
A Michael S. Rapich, R-A-P-I-C-H. 
Q By whom are you employed, sir? 
A Utah Highway Patrol. 
Q How long have you been with- -
A Just over three years. 
THE COURT: This is the only witness you 
intend to call? 
MR. UPDEGROVE: Today, yes, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right, you may proceed. 
Q (BY MR. UPDEGROVE) Are you a certified peace 
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officer in the state of Utah? 
A Yes, I am. 
Q Nov, turning to the 1st of October of 1994, 
last year, at about 30 minutes past midnight, were you 
on duty? 
A Yes, I was. 
Q And what were you doing, sir? 
A I was working DUI enforcement in the Salt 
Lake area on State Street. 
Q In Salt Lake County? 
A Yes. 
Q Now, as X say, approximately 30 minutes past 
midnight, did your attention get drawn to a gray Honda 
Prelude northbound on State Street? 
A Yes, it did. 
Q For what reason, sir? 
A It didn't have a front plate. 
Q Now, as far as front plates are concerned, 
have you had occasion before to stop vehicles for front 
plates? 
A Yes, on many occasions. 
Q Why do you do that, sir? 
A It's been my experience as a police officer 
that quite often when a vehicle doesn't have a front 
plate, the plate on the rear of the vehicle doesn't 
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belong to it, either* A lot of times someone will just 
grab one plate off another vehicle and put it on the 
rear of the vehicle* 
THE COURT: Do you want to pull up the 
microphone, please, and speak up a little bit? 
THE WITNESS: Which was the case on this 
occasion. 
Q (BY MR. UPDEGROVE) Now, are you familiar 
with the statute that requires a front license plate? 
A Yes, I am. 
Q And is that the reason you stopped the 
vehicle? 
A Yes, it was. 
Q How many people were in the gray Honda 
Prelude when you stopped it? 
A Just one. 
Q And is that individual, the driver, present 
in court today? 
A Yes, he is. 
Q Would you please point him out and describe 
what he's wearing? 
A He's seated right next to the defense 
attorney, wearing a purple shirt and a black vest. 
THE COURT: The record will reflect an 
identification of the defendant. 
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Q (BY MR UPDEGROVE) what did you ask of the 
defendant when you stopped him? 
A I asked for his driver's license and 
registration. 
Q Did he produce the registration? 
A I don't believe he did. He did produce a 
driver's license. 
Q Did he make any statements spontaneous to you 
about his driver's license? 
A Yes, he did. He advised me that his license 
was suspended. 
Q For what reason, sir? 
A I found out later it was for DUX. I don't 
think he told me at the time. 
Q Nov, did he tell you anything initially at 
the stop about the nature of the vehicle? 
A Yes, he told me it belonged to a friend of 
his, that he'd known since high school, a female friend. 
Q And what was he doing with the vehicle? 
A He'd borrowed the vehicle to help another 
friend in a moving situation. 
Q Did you ask him to exit the vehicle? 
A Yes, I did. 
Q And where did you place him? 
A I had him move to the rear of the vehicle out 
1 of traffic. 
2 Q Nov, what was your intent when you found out 
3 the vehicle, his license was suspended? What was your 
4 I intent at that point? 
5 A Well, he wasn't going to drive the vehicle 
6 I any longer. I was going to investigate the natter 
7 further and find out why his license was suspended. 
8 1 Q And did you do that? 
9 A Yes, I did. 
10 I Q And for what reason, sir? 
11 J A Why did I find out why 
12 Q Why was it suspended? 
13 I A It was suspended for DUI. 
14 Q Did you find out if there were any warrants 
15 for hin? 
16 A Yes, he did, he had a warrant for DUI. 
17 Q Now, knowing that, was he going to drive off 
18 with the vehicle? 
19 I A No, he wasn't. 
20 I Q Were you going to arrest hin? 
21 I A For Once I found out he had a warrant, I 
22 was going to take hin to Salt Lake County Jail. 
23 Q Now, but prior to that, did you ask to search 
24 the vehicle? 
25 I A Yes, I did. 
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Q And did you find anything in the vehicle? 
A Yes, I did. 
Q What did you find, sir? 
A In the- - Located in a black fanny pack on 
the rear seat, I found two plastic baggies containing a 
white powdery substance. 
Q Was there anything else on the seat? 
A There was also a cloth gym bag. 
Q And did you search that? 
A Yes, I did. 
Q And what was in that? 
A There was a set of scales and a purple box 
which had white powder residue on them, also numerous 
baggies identical to the ones that contained the 
methamphetamine. There was approximately a hundred of 
those. 
Q Did you run the plate? 
A Yes, I did. 
Q Was it registered to the vehicle? 
A No, it was not. 
Q Did you run the VIN number? 
A Yes, I did. 
Q Did you find anything on the VIN number? 
A I was unable to find any record of the VIN 
number in any of the surrounding states for Utah. 
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Q Did the defendant consent to the search? 
A Yes, he did. 
MR. UPDEGROVE: Thank you, sir. 
THE COURT: You may proceed. 
MR. MAURO: Thank you, Your Honor. 
CROSS EXAMINATION 
BY MR. MAURO: 
Q Trooper Rapich, did you fill out a report in 
this case? 
A Yes, I did. 
Q And is that the report that you have in your 
hand? 
Yes, it is. 
MR. MAURO: May I approach the witness, Your 
Honor? 
THE COURT: You may. 
Q (BY MR. MAURO) You've got what's been 
provided to me as an incident report. Is that your 
incident report? 
A I believe so. It looks like it. 
Q And for the record, that's a typed statement; 
is that right? 
A Yes, it is. 
Q And at the top of it, it says "Incident 
Report"? 
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A Yes, it does. 
Q On that report you have the date of the 
incident is 10-13 of '94; is that right? 
A Yes. 
Q You also have the date of the report, 
however, of 7-14 of '94, which would be several months 
earlier; is that right? 
A Yes, that's true. The only thing I could say 
for that is, it's typed by a secretary and she must not 
have changed that date on the report. It's a format 
that's in her computer and she just uses the same format 
for every report. Obviously she didn't change that date 
when she made the report. 
Q So there was a mistake in the report, then; 
is that right? 
A Yes. 
Q Now, on this date you said that you are 
participating in what you call DUI intervention? 
A That could be termed that way, yes. 
Q is that right? Now, you saw the gray Prelude 
driving down the road; is that right? 
A Yes. 
Q You didn't note any, other than a license 
plate, any equipment violations with the- -
A Right. 
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1 I Q There was no weaving? 
2 | A No. 
3 I Q No swerving? 
4 I A No. 
5
 I Q No crossing the line that you observed? 
6 I A No. 
7 Q Were you driving toward the vehicle, or were 
8 I you behind the vehicle when you- -
9
 A I was driving towards the vehicle, I was 
10 I southbound. 
11 Q And you observed that it didn't have a front 
12 I plate? 
13 A Yes. 
14
 Q And you had some suspicion that the plate on 
15 the back may have been plac%d on there, it didn't belong 
16 to the car that, the Prelud*; is that right? 
17 A Well, as a routine matter I stop vehicles 
18 with no front plate, and th% reason I started doing that 
19 I is I found quite commonly that's the case, yes. 
20 Q But prior to the time of doing the stop you 
21 I didn't run a license plate on the- -
22 I A No, I did not. 
23 Q And you didn't m n a license plate when you 
24 I got out and you. approached ltr. Alires, did you? 
25 A No, I did not. 
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1 I Q In fact, you didn't run the license plate 
2 I until after you had placed Mf. Alires under arrest; is 
3 that right? 
4 A After I placed hi* under arrest for 
5 possession of methamphetamin*; y«s. 
6 I Q That was after yoi* had conducted the search? 
7 A Yes. 
8 I Q So prior to doing the search you hadn't run a 
9 license plate; is that right? 
10 A No. 
11 Q You hadn't run a warrants check? 
12 A No, I had not. 
13 Q And you hadn't had any communication with 
14 dispatch regarding ownership of the gray Prelude? 
15 I A Yes. 
16 Q You pulled the vehicle over with your lights? 
17 A Yes. 
18 Q The vehicle pulled over? 
19 A Yes. 
20 Q Mr. Alires was th# driver? 
21 I A Yes. 
22 I Q You approached Mr* Alires and asked him to 
23 step out? 
24 A After I found out that his driver's license 
25 was suspended, yes, I did* 
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Q Let me ask you some questions about that. 
A Okay. 
Q In your report you detailed the order of 
events as they occurred; is that right? 
A I tried to, yes. 
Q And it's an accurate depiction of how the 
events in this case occurred; is that right? 
A Okay, yes. 
Q And it was written on, actually over a year 
ago; is that right? 
A Yes, it was. 
Q And when we look at it today, a year later, 
we can say that this is accurate; is that right? 
A Yes. 
Q And it was written at a time when it was 
fresher, or you had a better memory of the events; is 
that right? 
A Yes. 
Q You said that Mr. Alires stepped out of the 
vehicle, right? Or that you asked him for a driver's 
licenmm and a registration. 
A Yes, I did. 
Q He produced his driver's license, is what you 
say. 
A Uh-huh. 















If you look on your report; is that right? 
Yes. 
He wasn't able to produce the registration? 
Uh-huh. 
Okay. And he gave you the name; is that 1 
Gave ae which name? 
His name. 
I think I got it off the driver's license he 
And that was accurate; is that right? 
Yes, Z believe so. 
So then you brought him to the back of his 





After he stated that his driver's license was 1 
tion. 1 
And you began questioning him about the 1 







License plate- - Questioned him about the J 
of the vehicle initially. 
And he told you that a friend owned the 
Yes. 
You didn't write him a citation for no plate, 
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did you? 
A I believe I warned him for that. 
Q Did you write him- - You didn't write him a 
citation for suspended driver's license at that point? 
A Yes, I did. 
Q You did? 
A Yes. 
Q Do you have a copy of that with you? 
A Yes, I do. 
MR. MAURO: I'm sorry, Judge, I don't have 
that. 
THE COURT: That's all right. 
Q (BY MR. MAURO) When was that written? 
A That was written on 13 October, 1994. 
Q Was that written before you conducted the 
search, or after you conducted the search? 
A After. 
Q So what you did, then, the course of events, 
you knew that he had a suspended driver's license? 
A Yes, I did. 
Q But you didn't do a dispatch at that point? 
A Not at that point. 
Q You began questioning him about the car 
ownership? 
A Yes. 












he told you his friend owned the car? 
•aid a female friend, yes. 
at that point you weren't writing a 
you? 
I was not. 
At that point you were questioning him, then 






you began questioning him about weapons 





















weren't writing a citation at that point? 
long had he been detained at that point 
asking him questions about the weapons? 




during that five-minute period of time, 1 
t written a citation? 1 
No. He was not free to leave, and he was not 1 
be until Z determined why his license was 
I 
THE COURT: Officer, would you wait for the 
please. Just answer what's asked of you. 1 
(BY MR. MAURO) So for that five-minute 
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period of time between the time you stopped him and the 
time you began asking him about the weapons, you didn't 






No, I did not. 
You didn't begin writing a citation? 
No, I didn't. 
And you didn't do a dispatch check of any 




Your questions were directed mostly toward 
Mr. Alires, who was standing, facing you, talking to 




Prior to the time that you began asking him 











No, he did not. 
He didn't say that he had any weapons? 
No. 
He didn't show you any weapons? 
No. 
And you didn't see any weapons in the 1 
No. 
You didn't note any bulges on this clothing? 1 
Not that Z recall, no. 
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Q Then you began asking him about whether he 
had anything illegal in the vehicle. 
A Yes. 
Q Prior to that tine he hadn't said that he had 
anything illegal, had he? 
A No. 
Q You hadn't observed anything illegal on his 
person? 
A No. 
Q You hadn't observed anything illegal in the 
car? 
A No. 
Q After you asked those questions, you then 
asked if he "minded if I looked in the vehicle.** Those 
were the words that you wrote in your report; is that 
right? 
A I asked him if he minded if I looked in the 
vehicle, yes. 
Q And he said, initially, he didn't mind if you 
looked in the vehicle; is that right? 
A No, he did not. 
Q You didn't use the word "search the vehicle" 
in your report? 
A No, I did not. 





Yes, it is. 





And that it would be appropriate for you to 
1 contact the owner, or for him to contact the owner. 
A I think is what he said is, he stated, NI 
think the owner needs to give you permission to search 
















Did you make any attempts to call the owner? 
No, I did not. 
Did you have dispatch make any attempts to 
owner? 
No, I did not. 1 
Did you allow Mr. Alires to call the owner? 1 
I did not. He didn't ask to. 
As you previously indicated, he was not free 1 
at that point? 1 
No, he was not. 1 
You opened the door of the vehicle; is that 1 
The passenger door, yes. 1 
You went inside the vehicle? 1 
Yes. 
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1 I Q There was a black fanny pack in there. 
3 A Yes. 
3 I Q And you opened the fanny pack? 
4 1 A I did. 
5 1 Q By unzipping it? 
6 A Yes. 
7 I Q And there was another gym bag in there? 
8 A Yes. 
9 I Q And that was a closed gym bag? 
10 I A Yes, it was. 
11 I Q And you opened that bag by unzipping it? 
13 A Yes. 
13 I Q Are you familiar with the Miranda admonition? 
14 A Yes, I am. 
15 I Q If I could have you look through your report, 
16 I don't see any indication that Mr. Alires was given the 
17 I Miranda admonition. 
18 I A He was not. 
19 I Q When you opened the black fanny pack you 
30 I found an item that you believed was an illegal 
31 substance; is that right? 
33 A Yes. 
33 I Q Let me ask you- - Let me take a step back. 
34 In your mind, Mr. Alires was detained, at the point when 
35 you initially stopped him, when you learned that he had 
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1 I a suspended driver's license? 
2 I A Yes, he was. 
3 1 Q He wasn't free to leave at that point? 
4 | A He was not. 
5 Q And you were going to arrest him? 
6 I A Yes, I was. 
7 I Q And you didn't read him Miranda at that time? 
8 A No, I didn't. 
9 I Q Then you conducted a search of the vehicle; 
10 is that right? 
11 A Yes. 
12 Q And when you conducted the search of the 
13 vehicle you discovered some things inside the vehicle. 
14 A Yes. 
15 Q And you had a suspicion that they were 
16 illegal narcotics? 
17 A Yes. 
18 Q You didn't read Mr. Alires the Miranda 
19 I admonition at that point? 
20 A No, I did not. 
21 I Q After that point, you asked Mr. Alires some 
22 questions about the ownership of the fanny pack? 
23 A Yes. 
24 I Q And you talked, you asked him who owned the 
25 fanny pack? 
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A Yes, I did. 
Q And that's when Mr. Alires told you- -
A He said something to the effect that, "I 
won't lie to you, it's mine.19 
Q Did you use a consent form at all? 
A No, I did not. 
Q Do you have consent forms available to use? 
A We have, the Highway Patrol has a consent 
form. I didn't use it at this time. 
Q At the time when you conducted the search, 
how many officers were present? 
A There was a second officer responded to the 
scene, I don't know if I'd started the search yet or 
not. I believe he had already arrived. I'm not sure. 
Q That was- -
A Trooper Roberts. 
Q So there were two patrol vehicles there at 
some point, anyway? 
A Yes. 
Q There were two patrol vehicles there when you 
questioned Mr. Alires about the ownership of the 
substance? 
A Yes, there was. 
THE COURT: Just a minute. I feel like we're 
on some kind of race track, here. And it's hard for me 
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to lake in the answers that are coming so fast, I 
suspect my court reporter is having a hard time getting 
it down. Please wait until the question is fully asked, 
take a breath, then answer. If we could pick- - Slow 
down the pace a little bit, please, and then we'll maybe 
understand what's being said. 
Could you repeat the last question, and let 
me get the answer again, please? 
MR. MAURO: I've forgotten it now. 
Q (BY MR. MAURO) There wasn't any evidence 
that this vehicle was stolen, was there? 
A No, there wasn't any hard evidence, no. 
There was some suspicion in my mind that there's a 
possibility of that, but no, there was no solid 
evidence. 
Q Did you ever make any attempts to contact the 
owner of the vehicle? 
A I never was able to determine who the owner 
of the vehicle was. 
MR. MAURO: I don't have any further 
questions. 
THE COURT: All right, redirect? 
MR. UPDE6R0VE: Very briefly, Your Honor. 
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REDIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. UPDEGROVE: 
Q Was that vehicle impounded after Mr. Alires 
was arrested? 
A Yes, it was. 
Q Was there a search conducted pursuant to the 
impound? 
A An inventory search, yes. 
MR. UPDEGROVE: Thank you, sir. 
THE COURT: You may step down. 
THE WITNESS: Thank you. 
THE COURT: Thank you for your assistance. 
Is there any reason why this officer can't be excused? 
MR. UPDEGROVE: I would like him to remain, 
Your Honor. I have to talk to him a little bit. 
THE COURT: Then that'll be the order. Any 
other witnesses? 
MR. UPDEGROVE: None for the state, Your 
Honor. 
MR. MAURO: No, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: You may proceed with oral 
argument. Mr. Updegrove, you have the burden. Do you 
want to go forward? Let me remind you that I haven't 
had any chance to read the memorandum. 
MR. UPDEGROVE; I'm sorry, Your Honor, I have 
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no idea vhare it vent. 
THE COURT: Well, occasionally things are 
misfiled downstairs, but since Mr. Mauro doesn't have a 
copy of it, either, I suspect it just never vent out. 
MR. UPDEGROVE: I will find out about that as 
soon as I get back, Your Honor. 
Your Honor, first of all, looking at 
Mr. Mauro's motion, the stop vas valid. He claims it is 
not, but I believe, under State v. Lopez, the Supreme 
Court said that there's no longer the necessity to look 
at it from a reasonable officer's standpoint. 
THE COURT: Z can't understand you. Do you 
vant to pull that up and repeat that again, please? 
MR. UPDEGROVE: I'm sorry. Under State v. 
Lopez, the Supreme Court has stated that there's no 
necessity to look at a traffic stop from the reasonable 
officer's standpoint. It is clear here that there vas a 
violation, there vas no front license plate, and I 
believe the Utah Code Annotated 14-1A-404(1). 
And on top of that, Trooper Rapich has stated 
in his experience he has found that vhen you only have 
one license plate, sometimes the vehicle, the license 
plate has been stolen, and only one has been taken. 
That's vhy there's none on the front. 
But regardless of that, there is a violation 
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of the Utah Code vhich, under Lopes, the officer vas 
certainly, or the trooper vas certainly, his action vas 
appropriate in stopping the vehicle. 
You also had heard, Your Honor, that 
Mr. Alires, who's been identified as the driver, the 
only person in the vehicle, stated almost immediately 
upon being asked for a driver's license and 
registration, he could not produce a registration, and 
he stated his license vas suspended. Then you heard the 
trooper say that he intended to arrest him at that 
point. 
Nov, the trooper then asked consent to search 
the vehicle. It's our argument that that's just gilding 
the lily. When he intended to arrest, he vas going, 
since there vas only one person in the vehicle, he vas 
going to impound the vehicle, and he vas going to do an 
impound search, and a search incident to arrest. 
So there's tvo points. Search incident to 
arrest, and an impound search, particularly after he 
found out that the vehicle, the license plate on the 
rear, did not match the vehicle. He ran the VZN number 
and he could not, as you heard him state, find the 
ovner. So the vehicle vas going to be impounded, and it 
vas impounded. 
THE COURT: Don't you have a problem, here, 
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Mr. Updegrove, in that he didn't arrest him at that 
point in time, before the search was conducted? He may 
have had that in mind, he may have had the basis for the 
arrest at that point in time, but he did not effectuate 
the arrest until after the search. Isn't that a 
problem? 
MR. UPDEGROVE: I don't see that as a 
problem, Your Honor. Z believe the case lav is that you 
don't have to say the magic words. 
THE COURT: But an arrest had not occurred. 
It isn't just a question of magic words. 
MR. UPDEGROVE: Well, I believe Trooper 
Rapich said he was not free to go, Mr. Alires would not 
be free to go, once he had stated that his license was 
suspended. 
THE COURT: And so you say that's the same 
thing as an arrest? 
MR. UPDEGROVE: Hell, I believe the case law 
is once somebody is not free to go, they're in custody. 
And that's 
THE COURT: Well, that's a custodial 
determination. That may be useful to look at in the 
context of the statements, but I'm now talking about 
impound searches subsequent to an arrest. And what I'm 
saying is there did not appear to have been an arrest 
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until after the search. 
MR. UPDEGROVE: Granted, Your Honor, the 
trooper did not say the magic words, "You're under 
arrest." He asked hia to get out of the vehicle, took 
him back to the rear of the vehicle. And then he asked, 
determined that it was a borrowed vehicle, the vehicle 
had been borrowed from a friend, it wasn't Mr. Alires# 
vehicle. And then he asked if he could- - Well, he 
didn't say, "Could I search the vehicle?" "Could I look 
in the vehicle? 
Mr. Alires did eventually say he could look 
in the vehicle. He found the drugs in the fanny pack, 
and the formal arrest flowed from the drugs, from 
checking with dispatch that the license plates did not 
match the vehicle, and that Mr. Alires had a warrant for 
his arrest for failure to appear. 
I would submit that Mr. Alires was going to 
be arrested. Once the trooper found all of the 
information, eventually Mr. Alires would have been 
arrested. There is no doubt about it, he was not going 
to be allowed to go off with the vehicle, and there 
would be an impound search. So it was inevitable that 
that fanny pack- -
THE COURT: But this wasn't an impound 
search. Isn't that a distinction with a huge 
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difference? 
MR. UPDEGROVE: Hell, Your Honor, I would say 
that if it's inevitable that that vehicle is going to be 
subjected to an impound search, that the drugs would 
have been found. 
Now, what if Mr. Mauro argues that if he was 
not arrested immediately and all of the magic words 
said, and the search incident to arrest, since the 
vehicle was going to be impounded? Z don't see the 
difference if eventually, once Trooper Rapich discovered 
the plates didn't match, the VIN number, he couldn't 
determine an owner, and found out, in fact, that the 
license was suspended and there was a warrant for his 
arrest, Mr. Alires is not going to go free. He was the 
only person in the vehicle, that vehicle was going to be 
seized and impounded, and that would have been found. 
If the argument is that Trooper Rapich did 
not say, at that point that he comes out of the vehicle, 
finds the license, Mr. Alires admits that the license is 
suspended, he doesn't say, "You're under arrest," then I 
find it hard to understand how any impound search could 
become valid at some point later on. 
Mr. Alires was going to be arrested, and I 
don't see how the defense can argue that the state would 
not have found that evidence eventually. Inevitably. 
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And that's basically the State's argument. 
THE COURT: All right, thank you* Mr. Mauro? 
MR. MAURO: Thank you, Your Honor. 
Judge, I guess vhat my primary concern is, is 
one of the questions that you asked. This isn't an 
inventory search. And Z wasn't prepared- -
THE COURT: I'm going to find- - I mean 
there's no question about it, and the distinction in 
terms of timing is a critical one. As a matter of law, 
the court finds that this was not a search of an 
impound-type nature. It occurred far before the vehicle 
was seized, or the car. 
But I think we do have a viable question as 
to whether or not consent existed. Why don't we focus 
on that. 
MR. MAURO: Just one additional point on the 
inventory. I guess what I'm concerned about, the issue 
has been raised, we hadn't been provided any documents 
about whether an inventory search had been conducted, we 
weren't aware of that. It's certainly our intent to 
challenge any inventory search, and I'm just looking 
down the road a ways. 
THE COURT: The bottom line is, it wasn't 
found as part of an inventory or impound search. It was 
found before that as part of the basis for what I 
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understand to have been the arrest* 
MR. MAURO: Right. And the first issue 
The way I see it, there are three in this case. Number 
one, is there voluntary consent? Which is what State 
versus Loyola talks about. Number two, was voluntary 
consent given at a time when the police had a right to 
detain Mr. Alires? And number three, what was the scope 
of that consent? 
And I'll address the first one. Was the 
consent voluntary? Bobo and Whittenbeck set out a 
five-part test. The absence of claim of authority to 
search by the officers. Clearly Mr. Alires is detained. 
He's standing on the side of the road. There's an 
authority figure that's asking him to search. So 
clearly there are police there, there's probably another 
backup officer there asking them to search. 
The question becomes, is he giving voluntary 
consent under those circumstances? We would argue that 
he's not. The absence of an exhibition of force by the 
officers, there were no guns drawn, there were no 
threatening manners. However, I would submit that at 
12:30 in the evening there is in somewhat of a coercive 
nature about it. 
THE COURT: Where's the coercion? Z mean 
that, I think you're going to need to flesh out for me, 
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because what I aav on tha witness stand was an officer 
who appears to ba fast speaking, but soft spoken, 
appears to ba a gentle, professional individual* 
Where's the coercion? There are no coercive statements 
that you elicited. 
MR. MAURO: No, and I guess what I'm saying, 
Your Honor, is the general nature of a police-citizen 
encounter is going to be somewhat coercive, particularly 
when the citizen is not free to leave. 
THE COURT: Isn't that, then, Mr. Mauro, that 
every time somebody is stopped, it's arguably coercive 
if a law enforcement officer is there? 
MR. MAURO: And it's one of the factors that 
the court can consider in the totality of the 
circumstances. And I would agree, there isn't a direct 
threat, there's no indication of voices being raised, 
but Z think in the totality of circumstances the court 
should consider that. 
The third is a mere request to search. And 
in this case, Your Honor, it's somewhat unusual. Is 
there a mere request to search—and I'll talk about that 
when I talk about the scope of the consent—but there is 
a consent to search. Mr. Alires' response is—and 
remember, he's not free to leave—"I think we need to 
contact the owner. I think we should get the owner 
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involved in the search." 
And there's no attempt at all to allow the 
owner to come there. There is, nonetheless, a search 
that occurs under the circumstances of the case. And I 
would suggest to the court that this was something more 
than a mere request to search. 
Cooperation by the owner is the fourth one, 
and clearly we didn't have that here. There was no 
attempt to contact the owner. 
Absence of deception or trick on the part of 
the officer. And Z don't know what was going on there, 
Your Honor. Z do know that there was a response by 
Mr. Alires which was an appropriate response. "Let's 
contact the owner." And then after that, some period of 
time, we don't know what time that is, there's a search 
that's conducted of the vehicle initiated by the 
officer. Him opening the door and going into the 
vehicle. 
Do we have the absence of deception or trick 
on the part of the officer? Z don't know. Z do know 
that there were questions and there were responses to 
those questions that weren't dealt with, and then 
there's a search of the vehicle. Z don't know what 
happened in that interim period of time. 
The second question is, under Arroyo, is 
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there attenuation? Was the request to search 
sufficiently attenuated? In other words, and I guess 
the simple way of looking at that, did the police, at 
the time they asked to search, have a right to detain 
Mr. Alires? 
He's detained for a period of five minutes. 
There are no citations that are written at that point, 
there's no confirmation from dispatch, there's nothing 
done to initiate the ticket-writing process. And after 
a five-minute period of time, your inquiry into a 
completely different area involving weapons, and maybe 
illegal items that may have been placed in the vehicle. 
Would Mr. Alires have been free to leave 
after he'd been written a ticket? He may very well have 
been. There are circumstances, I suspect, where he may 
have been written a ticket during that five-minute 
period of time, and then be allowed to leave. 
What would have happened to the vehicle, I 
suppose, is speculation. But the point is, at the point 
that they begin asking him for permission to search, a 
five-minute period of time, and nothing has been done to 
initiate or complete the stop. 
And we would suggest that at that period of 
time that they have exceeded the scope of their 
authority by not doing that, and therefore that's 
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another factor for the court to consider in going to 
consent, number one. And number two, the legality of 
the consent, or Mr. Alires' legality. 
The third, and I think probably the most 
important issue, Your Honor, is the scope of the 
consent. And if I can remember the officer's words 
correctly, he asked, "Do you mind if I look in the 
vehicle?" There's nothing about searching the vehicle, 
nothing about going in the vehicle, nothing about 
opening containers within the vehicle. "Do you mind if 
Z look in the vehicle?" And Mr. Alires' response was, 
"No, I don't mind if you look in the vehicle." 
There's nothing about opening the door during 
that request, or nothing about going to the fanny pack 
or the gym bag, or anything else in the vehicle, looking 
in the glove box, or conducting a full-blown search. I 
think a citizen would think that to mean, "Sure, go 
ahead and look in the vehicle," maybe walking up to the 
vehicle and looking inside the vehicle. The scope of 
the consent isn't a full-blown search, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: But, on the other hand, 
Mr. Mauro, the defendant is there, and when the officer 
goes to look in the fanny pack, he doesn't register any 
negative response. He doesn't say, "Stop, you're not 
now just looking in tha vehicle, you're going beyond 
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that." And he's right there* I Bean he had the 
opportunity to object at that point, did he not? 
MR- MAURO: I think he objected prior to that 
by saying, "Let's get the owner here*" And so there's 
some ambiguity. Nov, when the officer, he says, "No, 
you can't search, we need to have the owner here," and 
then he eays, "No, I don't mind if you look in there," 
at very best there's confusion on Mr. Alires' part. 
I mean what's his ability at that point? Can 
he say, "No, don't go in there"? I don't think he's 
going to object. He's objected once already, the 
objection has been rebuffed, there's been nothing done 
to contact the owner. 
At that point, I mean he's standing there on 
the side of the road, the officer goes in and opens the 
door. I suggest that he's not going to object any more 
to what the police officer's doing. 
Just briefly, Arroyo deals with the scope of 
the consent. And it quotes Professor LaFave on page 
691, and it talks about scope of consent, and I've 
argued that already. 
We would submit it. We would argue that any 
statements made are subject to be suppressed because no 
Miranda was given. 
THE COURT: All right, as to the first 
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statement, the statement that, "I have a suspended 
license,** the motion to suppress, if you're seeking to 
suppress that, is denied. The court finds that that was 
spontaneously stated, it was not in response to a 
specific inquiry or question, consequently Miranda does 
not cover that. 
As to the second statement concerning 
ownership of the fanny pack, your motion to suppress is 
granted. 
That leaves us with the bigger question, and 
that is the search, itself. Do you want to speak to 
that issue again, Mr. Updegrove? 
MR. UPDEGROVE: Yes, ma'am. 
THE COURT: Just to clarify my prior comment 
with reference to the second statement, it was clearly a 
statement of an important nature in response to either 
an implied or an actual-asked question, and the court 
finds that Miranda should have been given before any 
additional interrogation or questioning and statements 
occurred. 
MR. UPDEGROVE: And the State is not going to 
argue about that. I notice we didn't get into that on 
the examination of Trooper Rapich. He and I have 
discussed it, when you're in custodial interrogation and 
you are interrogating somebody, you're supposed to give 
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1 I them Miranda. 
2 1 Nov, in response to Mr. Mauro, the factors he 
3 stated concerning the getting, finding the owner. In 
4 I this case you heard the trooper state that the license 
5 plate was registered to another vehicle, and running the 
6 VIN number, he could not find an owner. And he was not 
7 I told an owner that he can remember. And the defendant 
8 I did give permission the second time. He said, "Yes, 
9 okay, you can look." 
10 Now, Trooper Rapich has also stated that the 
11 defendant was not going to leave, he was not free to 
12 leave, he was going to be arrested. 
13 Now, as to Mr. Mauro's statement on, "Mind if 
14 I look in the vehicle?" Well, let's look at that in the 
15 common sense viewpoint. The trooper had a flashlight, 
16 he could look in the vehicle. If you want to take the 
17 I words, "Mind if I look in the vehicle?" the trooper 
18 didn't need any permission to shine his flashlight into 
19 that vehicle. 
20 The trooper could look into the vehicle, it 
21 was in plain view. Truly what the trooper said, and he 
22 probably should have said, "Do you mind if I search the 
23 I vehicle?" when you say "look into the vehicle," it's 
24 not, "Mind if I look in the vehicle and see what's 
25 there?" It's, "I'm going to look into the vehicle and 
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search it." And as Your Honor correctly pointed out, 
when that started there was no objection from 
Mr. Alires. 
THE COURT: Let me just take a minute and 
read the state's memorandum in opposition. 
All right, with reference to the motion to 
suppress, the court finds the following: 
The motion is denied. The court finds that 
the initial stop was an appropriate and proper stop. 
There was a basis for the stop by virtue of the 
statutory violation of the plate statute. That's 
14-1A-404. That provided the trooper with the basis for 
stopping the individual who was behind the wheel, this 
defendant. 
The detention and the timing of the same 
appearing reasonable in view of how the search occurred, 
et cetera. It was not an unduly long time. Although 
it's not clear how long total was involved, it appears 
clear that only some five minutes passed before the 
indication that additional crimes had occurred became 
clear. 
The problematic aspect of this, however, has 
to do with the consent. The court finds that there was 
not a clear, unequivocal voluntary consent. The reason 
forms are developed by police departments, such as the 
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highway patrol, is to obviate, or avoid this problem. 
Had a form been used, the defendant would have seen 
exactly what was being asked of him, that it was not 
just a request to look in a vehicle, but a consent to 
search the vehicle, and the contents of the same. 
It's questionable whether the defendant would 
have then said yes, given his prior responses. So the 
court finds that the basis for the search cannot be 
adequately supported by the consent argument. 
However, the court finds that it is clear 
that at the point in time that the officer asked the 
defendant, Mr. Alires, if he could look in the vehicle, 
he had already determined that he had enough to arrest 
the defendant. He had indicated it was his intent, or 
plan to arrest the defendant at that point in time, and 
he had indicated that the defendant was not free to 
leave. 
And while this is very different from an 
arrest, it certainly is incident to an arrest, and that 
is, I think, the significant thing, here. The case law 
is quite clear that what one should look for is whether 
the search was substantially contemporaneous with the 
arrest. And under these circumstances, given the timing 
involved, the totality of fact and circumstance, I 
conclude that it was substantially contemporaneous. 
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Therefore, the search was not an impound 
search, that is clear. It was not a consent search, 
because the consent was equivocal. But rather, it was a 
search predicated upon, well, a search incident to 
arrest. 
While the search occurred prior to the 
arrest, it occurred subsequent to the intent to arrest, 
and substantially contemporaneous with the same. So the 
motion, as I indicated, is denied. 
There's a lesson to be learned, here, 
Officer- - And the court will further find, before I 
get into that, that there is nothing coercive that has 
been attested to, and the court has considered carefully 
the appearance and demeanor of the police officer. And, 
as I referenced earlier on the record, he is a 
soft-spoken, gentle-appearing individual, both in his 
demeanor and in his physical presence, et cetera. 
And the court cannot find that the mere fact 
that he was a police officer engaged in his official 
duties, where no weapon by the police officer was ever 
exhibited, nor forceful commands were ever made, or 
anything else of that type occurred, that this was 
coercive, and that is one of the important aspects of 
this that the court has considered. 
Although typically that goes to the issue of 
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consent, and I have determined that the consent in this 
case was equivocal, I think it is one of the totality of 
circumstances that the court has considered in assessing 
the credibility of the witness for the state and the 
propriety of the search in general. 
As I was going to say before, Officer, one of 
the reasons that a form is employed, and would have been 
useful in this case, and would have helped with the 
equivocal consent issue, is that it clarifies what it is 
that the police officer is asking for, specifically what 
is going to be searched, et cetera. And then if the 
individual consents, you have his signature. 
In this case, as I say, it's not clear 
whether the defendant would have signed such a consent 
request or not. But in any event, the court has 
determined that the search was incident to arrest. Is 
there anything else we need to discuss at this time? 
MR. MAURO: No, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: I'm going to ask, Mr. Updegrove, 
that you prepare findings consistent with my ruling, but 
not necessarily limited to what I have verbally 
articulated, and also an order granting- - Well, it's 
denying the motion to suppress, and granting in part- -
Let me start again. Denying the motion to 
suppress as to the evidence seized, but granting in part 
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the motion to suppress as to statements, particularly 
the second statement that had to do with the ownership 
of the fanny pack. And get it to Mr. Mauro for his 
review, and then I'll sign it if there are no 
objections. 
We have a pretrial set for the 22nd of 
December, and we have a trial set for January 2nd. Are 
those dates still viable? 
MR. MAURO: Yes, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right. Anything further, 
then, that we need to handle today? 
MR. MAURO: The only issue, Your Honor, I can 
file a motion, is we're probably going to want to sever 
the driving on revocation charge from any drug charge, 
particularly if there were prior DUZs on the record. 
THE COURT: It provides the basis for the 
stop. It's going to be difficult for that to be severed 
as a practical matter, and legally I have some concerns 
about that. I'll be interested in looking at what you 
file and what Mr. Updegrove's response is on that. I 
see some problems with that. Anything else at this 
point? 
MR. MAURO: No, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right. We're in recess, 
then. Thank you both for the excellent job you did in 
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calling these issues to my attention, and we'll see you 
back here on the 22nd. 
* * * 
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Addendum C 
FILED DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
AUG 7 1997 
SALT LAKE COUNTY 
Deputy Cltrk 
2H THE DISTRICT COURT Of THB THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IV AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, t FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Plaintiff, t 
VS. S CASE NO. 951901698 
DEANO R. ALIRES, t 
Defendant. s 
Defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence and Motion to Suppress 
Custodial Statements, filed in the above-entitled matter, came on 
for hearing before the Court on November 27, 1995, at 9:30 a.m. 
Defendant was present and represented by counsel, Richard P. Mauro, 
Salt Lake Legal Defender Association, and the State of Utah was 
represented by Kenneth R. Updegrove, Deputy District Attorney. 
Findings submitted by the prosecution were objected to by defense 
counsel. The Court offered defendant's counsel an opportunity to 
draft proposed Findings. After a significant delay, these were 
finally submitted in late June, 1997. The Court has now considered 
all proposed Findings and enters the following Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law. 
In his Motion to Suppress Evidence, the defendant alleged Utah 
Highway Patrol Trooper Michael Rapich lacked reasonable articulable 
suspicion to stop and detain the motor vehicle driven by the 
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defendant. In his Motion to Suppress Custodial Statements, 
defendant alleges that the statements he made, were made while he 
was in custody and before he was informed of his constitutional 
rights under Miranda v. Arizona, Argument was made and testimony 
was taken from Trooper Rapich at the hearing, and the Court denied 
the Motion to Suppress Evidence and granted the Motion to Suppress 
the defendants statement. 
Being fully advised in the premises, the court makes the 
following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, based upon the 
credible testimony adduced. 
riwiwqg QF FACT 
1. That defendant was charged by Information in Count I, 
with Unlawful Possession of a Controlled Substance with Intent to 
Distribute; in Count II, with Unlawful Possession of Drug 
Paraphernalia; in Count III, with Driving on Denied, Suspended, 
Disqualified, or Revoked License; and in Count IV, defendant was 
charged with Driving without Registration or Certificate of Title. 
2. That the Information was based upon certain activities 
which took place during the early morning hours of October 13, 
1994, at 1700 South State Street, in Salt Lake County, State of 
Utah. 
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3. That Utah Highway Patrol Trooper, Michael Rapich, 
testified that he observed a gray Honda Prelude automobile 
traveling northbound on State Street. 
4. That he stated the Honda did not display a front license 
plate, 
5. That Trooper Rapich stopped the Honda because of the lack 
of a front license plate. 
6. That the defendant was the sole occupant of the Honda. 
7. That Trooper Rapich requested that the defendant produce 
his driver9s license and the Honda1s registration. 
8. That defendant produced a driver license which he stated 
was suspended because of a DUI violation. 
9. That defendant was unable to produce a vehicle 
registration. 
10. That defendant stated he had borrowed the Honda from one 
friend to help another friend move. 
11. That the Trooper stated he observed that the defendant 
acted in a nervous manner when questioned about the Honda's 
ownership. 
12. That at this point Trooper Rapich decided to arrest the 
defendant because the latter9s license was suspended. 
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13. That Trooper Rapich did not formally place the defendant 
under arrest, either by stating those words or by placing handcuffs 
on the defendant. 
14. That Trooper Rapich testified the defendant was not free 
to go at this point and that he believed defendant knew this, and 
that despite the fact that the word "arrest*9 was not spoken; 
defendant was in custody and, as a practical matter, "arrested." 
15. That Trooper Rapich testified that he then asked the 
defendant if there were weapons or anything illegal within the 
Honda. 
16* That the Trooper stated the defendant told him there were 
neither weapons nor illegal items in the vehicle. 
17. That Trooper Rapich testified he asked defendant if the 
latter "minded11 if the former "looked in the vehicle." 
18. That Rapich testified that the defendant initially stated 
he believed Trooper Rapich needed the owner's consent but 
eventually gave "consent" to look in the vehicle. 
19. That as the Trooper testified his appearance and demeanor 
was that of a gentle, soft-spoken person. That the Trooper was not 
large or intimidating in appearance or in his presence. 
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20. The Court finds the Trooper was credible in suggesting 
that a non-coercive, threatening situation existed. 
21. That Trooper Rapich testified that he discovered a black 
fanny pack and a cloth gym bag on the back seat of the Honda. 
22. That the Trooper testified that two small baggies 
containing a white powdery substance were located in the fanny 
pack. 
23. That he testified he also located several photographs in 
the fanny pack, and that one depicted the defendant. 
24. That the Trooper testified that the cloth gym bag 
contained approximately 100 small, empty baggies and a set of 
scales which bore a white powdery residue. 
25. That when questioned, defendant admitted to the ownership 
of the fanny pack and the controlled substance found within, which 
he identified as methamphetamine. 
26. That at the time of the questioning, Trooper Rapich had 
not yet informed defendant of his constitutional rights per Miranda 
Vt Arizona-
27. That Trooper Rapich subsequently determined that the rear 
license plate was not registered to the Honda in defendant's 
possession. 
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28. That Trooper Rapich could not determine ownership of the 
Honda through the VIN. 
29. That based upon the above, the Trooper testified that the 
defendant was then formally arrested and transported to the Salt 
Lake County Jail* 
30. That the Trooper testified that the defendant was 
detained for approximately five minutes before he was formally 
arrested. 
31. The Court finds that the Trooper was credible in his 
testimony and the Court adopts the referenced testimony as the 
facts. 
CQECWSIPPg PT fcftW 
Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court concludes, 
as a matter of law, that: 
1. The initial stop of defendant's vehicle was supportable, 
due to the observed licensure problem* 
2. The defendant was not subjected to an unreasonable 
detention• 
3* The defendant did not give clear, unequivocal consent to 
the Trooper, allowing a "consent search" of the vehicle, despite 
the Trooper's perception. 
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4. The search of the vehicle cannot, under these facts, be 
supported on the " impound exception" to the search warrant 
requirement* 
5. The statements concerning ownership of the controlled 
substance are not admissible, because they were made pursuant to an 
in-custody interrogation, while defendant was, practically 
speaking, under arrest, and defendant had not been informed of his 
"Miranda" right* to remain silent, etc. 
6. The search of the vehicle was substantially 
contemporaneous with defendant's arrest and probable cause existed 
for the arrest independent of the evidence found in the search* 
7. The evidence obtained as a result of the search of the 
Honda should not be suppressed, because it was obtained incident 
to, and substantially contemporaneous with the arrest of Mr. 
LESLIE A. LEWIS 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE ^ f c - : : 
000349 
STATE V. ALIRES PAGE EIGHT FINDINGS 6 CONCLUSIONS 
MAILIMO CBRTIFICATB 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, to the 
following, this *") day of August, 1997: 
Kenneth R. Updegrove 
Deputy District Attorney 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
231 East 400 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Richard P. Mauro 
Attorney for Defendant 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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